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The  Effects  of  External 
Inflationary  Shocks 
THE ECONOMY  IS ALWAYS  VULNERABLE  to a variety of external influences 
or shocks  that  have  important  impacts  on income,  employment,  and  prices. 
While  these  external  shocks  are  unforeseeable  and unavoidable,  economic 
policy  must somehow  deal with their  consequences. 
Lately  an alarming  number  of upward  jolts to prices  have come from 
sources  beyond  the normal  interaction  of production,  wages,  and prices. 
One  was  the  relative  decline  in the  value  of the  dollar  following  the  abandon- 
ment of the system  of fixed  exchange  rates,  which  raised  the prices  of im- 
ported  goods  and  contributed  to the  rise  in farm  prices  as exports  competed 
with  domestic  consumption.  A number  of other  events  shook  the economy 
at about the same time. Crop failures  in the Soviet Union resulted  in a 
gigantic  sale of American  grain.  The Peruvian  anchovy  catch  mysteriously 
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dropped,  contributing  to a worldwide  protein  shortage  and higher  prices 
for feedstocks.  Then  floods  in the Midwest  destroyed  part  of the soybean 
crop,  driving  feedstock  prices  still  higher.  Late  in 1973,  a cartel  of oil pro- 
ducers  got the upper  hand  over  the  buyer  cartel  and  forced  fuel  prices  dras- 
tically  upward.  Finally, the dismantling  of domestic  price controls  may 
undo whatever  downward  pressures  the program  had on the price  level. 
Because  these inflationary  surges  have substantial  effects  on real income 
and on relative  prices,  their  implications  for economic  stabilization  policy 
deserve  examination. 
The  consequences  of the recent  upward  shocks  to prices  will  be analyzed 
under  the assumption  that they are permanent,  even though  they may be 
overshadowed  by downward  disturbances  from  other  sources,  or  even  partly 
reverse  themselves  (anchovies  may reappear  off the coast of Peru and soy- 
bean fields  may yield a bumper  crop, for example).  This assumption  per- 
mits analysis  of the longer-run  consequences  of external  disturbances  that 
are  not quickly  reversed. 
Table 1 presents  recent  growth  rates  of selected  price  deflators  from  the 
national  income  accounts.  Farm  and import  prices  have  risen  at a tremen- 
dous rate; many of these increases  have found their way into consumer 
prices,  which  have  risen  substantially  relative  to the nonfarm  business  de- 
flator.  The extent  to which  monetary  policy  has contributed  to the current 
high  rates  of inflation  is a subject  of considerable  controversy.  We will  not 
enter  into this debate,  but rather  will  deal  with  the impact  of external  infla- 
Table  1. Changes  from  Preceding  Quarter  in Selected  Price  Deflators, 
National  Income  Accounts  Basis, 1972  and  1973 
Seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate of change in percent 
Gross  Consumer  Nonfarin 
Year  and  national  nondurables business,  Farm 
quarter  product  and services  adjusteda  business  Imports 
1972:1  5.7  3.0  5.0  20.6  3.8 
2  1.6  2.9  0.8  19.2  15.4 
3  2.7  3.2  1.8  28.7  6.7 
4  3.3  4.3  2.8  23.2  7.9 
1973:1  6.0  6.9  4.3  50.5  12.1 
2  7.2  8.7  5.4  75.8  40.9 
3  7.0  7.2  5.0  107.4  20.0 
4  8.7  10.0  7.1  4.2  35.6 
Source: Official data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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tionary  shocks  to the economy  and with the special  problems  that these 
disturbances  pose for monetary  policy.' 
An important  issue for monetary  policy is the type of response  that is 
appropriate  to externally  induced  surges  in inflation.  Some observers  have 
argued  that  monetary  policy  should  respond  vigorously  to these  price  surges, 
while  others  believe  that  policy  should  "accommodate"  them,  at least  in the 
short  run.  This  paper  argues  that the concept  of accommodation  is a slip- 
pery  one  in this  context.  Furthermore,  the  effects  of price  disturbances  may 
depend  in part on the source of the shock, and so, therefore,  may the 
appropriate  response  of monetary  policy. 
To examine  these  matters,  we have used a modified  version  of the MPS 
(MIT-Penn-SSRC)  quarterly  econometric  model to obtain quantitative 
estimates  of the effects on individual  sectors and on the economy as a 
whole of imposing  domestic  price controls and of a rise in foreign oil 
prices.  The  model  has been  adjusted  and  modified  in ways  described  below 
to make  it a more suitable  tool for analyzing  the special  problems  under 
study. 
The  following  section  attempts  to assess  the initial  impact  of external  in- 
flationary  shocks  on individual  sectors  of the economy  considered  in isola- 
tion. The sectors  most relevant  for the analysis  include  the money  market, 
consumption  expenditures,  and the interaction  of wages and prices.  The 
next section  reports  a simulation  of the full model to study  the effects  of 
these shocks  on the economy  as a whole,  and concludes  with a discussion 
of the possible  implications  for monetary  policy. 
Initial  Impacts  of Shocks 
In this section, we start with a general,  qualitative,  discussion  of the 
initial  impacts  of the shocks  on each sector,  and then turn  to a more de- 
tailed  discussion  of these  impacts  on the  relevant  sectors  of the  MPS  model. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
First we consider  the impact  that a sharp  increase  in the price of an 
imported  commodity-in this case, oil-has  on the demand  for money. 
1. While fiscal policy can, and probably should, play an important role in com- 
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In keeping  with  accepted  doctrine,  we shall  assume  that  the  public's  demand 
for money varies  directly  with the volume of transactions  and inversely 
with market  interest  rates.2  But this discussion  calls attention  to the well- 
known  problems  of an appropriate  measure  of transactions. 
Gross  national  product,  which  is often  used  as a proxy  for transactions, 
ignores  such  potential  complications  as the level  of integration  of the econ- 
omy and the absolute  levels of imports  and exports.  Thus,  for example,  if 
import prices rise relative to other prices, the GNP deflator  will re- 
main unchanged.  The rise in the prices of consumption  and investment 
goods containing  imports  will be offset  by the corresponding  rise  in prices 
of imports  themselves.  Thus, both nominal and real GNP remain  un- 
changed.  However,  importers  and purchasers  of final consumption  and 
investment  goods  will wish  to hold larger  money  balances  at given  interest 
rates and nominal  GNP to support  the larger  value of their  transactions. 
Thus,  when  import  prices  rise,  the corresponding  rise  in transactions-and 
hence  money  demand-are missed  if GNP is used  as the measure  of trans- 
actions. 
If the prices  of exports  rise  relative  to other  prices,  the GNP deflator  and 
nominal  GNP will  both  rise.  The  demand  for  money  should  rise  with  GNP, 
but probably  less than when  domestic  prices  rise; domestic  purchasers  of 
final  investment  and  consumption  goods  feel  no need  to hold larger  money 
balances  because  the value  of their  transactions  has not risen. 
In analyzing  the increase  in oil prices,  we will use GNP plus imports  as 
our measure  of transactions  demand,  and will provide  evidence  on the 
importance  of this  arbitrary  adjustment.  While  this  measure  probably  over- 
states  the impact  on transactions  of an increase  in prices  of imported  oil, 
it sets  an  upper  limit  to that  effect.  Because  we  do not consider  export  prices, 
no  adjustments  need be made to  the transactions  variable for this 
factor. 
The initial  effects  on the monetary  sector  of an increase  in the prices  of 
imported  oil follow from  this discussion  of transactions  demand.  Assume 
that the volume  of real transactions  is unchanged,  at least initially,  by a 
rise in import  prices  (or, more realistically,  that any initial drop in real 
transactions  is small  relative  to the price  increase).  The nominal  value of 
transactions  (GNP plus imports)  increases,  as just described,  augmenting 
2. For an excellent  discussion  of money demand  functions,  see Stephen  M. Goldfeld, 
"The  Demand  for Money  Revisited,"  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3:1973), 
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the demand  for money  at given  interest  rates  and  GNP. Thus,  other  things 
equal,  interest  rates  will rise  if the money  stock is fixed. 
The analysis  of the initial  impact  of the increase  in the price  of imported 
oil on the real volume of consumption  expenditures  is straightforward. 
Although  higher  import  prices  do not raise  the GNP deflator  they  do raise 
the prices  of consumption  goods.  This  rise  reduces  the real  value  of dispos- 
able  income  and of household  net worth,  since  the nominal  values  of these 
variables  are unaffected.  Thus,  initialiy  the price  increase  will reduce  real 
consumption  expenditures.  Nominal  consumption  expenditures  are likely 
to rise at first  because  consumers  wili adjust  real  purchases  slowly  to their 
reduced  real  incomes  and net worth.  Thus,  nominal  saving  drops  initially. 
The direction,  if not the size, of the initial  impact  on wages  and prices 
also can  be anticipated.  The  surge  in import  prices  wili  make  the goods  that 
workers  buy more  expensive,  putting  pressure  on wages,  and in turn tend- 
ing to raise  domestic  prices. 
The prices  of import-competing  goods should  also respond.  An increase 
in the world  price  of an internationally  traded  commodity  like oil would, 
in the absence  of regulation,  probably  spur  the same  increase  in the domes- 
tic price.  Prices  of energy  substitutes,  such as coal, should  rise as demand 
shifts  from  oil. Domestic  energy  producers  may  find  it profitable  to export 
their  product,  thus further  bidding  up the oil prices. 
These increases  in domestic  prices wili reinforce  the impacts of new 
prices  of imports.  In particular,  the transactions  demand  for money will 
expand  (this  time  because  nominal  GNP rises),  putting  additional  upward 
pressure  on interest  rates;  real  consumption  expenditures  will drop further 
due  to the additional  decline  in real  disposable  income  and  wealth;  finally, 
wages  and  prices  wili  tend  to  rise  in  response  to  the  increase  in domestic  prices. 
A rise  in domestic  oil prices  will  not be as deflationary  as a rise  in import 
prices of equal size because corporate  profits and investment  will be 
greater,  and the stock  market  will not experience  as serious  a decline  as re- 
sults  when  profits  go to foreigners.  Because  of these  differences,  the effects 
of a rise in domestic  oil prices  are qualitatively  more like those of decon- 
trolling  domestic  prices  when  they are under  pressure  to rise-the  second 
economic  event  considered  in this paper. 
RELEVANT SECTORS OF THE MPS MODEL 
The  impacts  described  above  can  be given  somewhat  greater  precision  by 
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equation  for the public's  holdings  of demand  deposits,  as modified  by the 
addition  of imports,  is shown  in equation  (1): 
(1)  In  DD  _-  0.28 In  DD-1 
(PjY) +  (Pimim)  (PyY)  +  (Pimim) 
-  0.06 In RTB -  0.12 In RSD 
+  0.08 n RDIS  -034  In N-005.  RDI&1_  N 
The demand  for nominal  demand  deposit balances  (DD) varies  directly 
with  real  GNP (y), real  imports  (im),  the GNP and  import  deflators  (P, and 
Pim),  changes  in the Federal  Reserve  discount  rate  (RDIS), and population 
(N). The demand  varies  negatively  with the Treasury  bill rate (RTB)  and 
the savings  deposit  rate  (RSD). 
The  basic  notion in this formulation  is that firms  and households  desire 
demand deposit balances for transactions  purposes. In equation (1), 
changes  in the prices  of both domesticaliy  produced  and imported  goods 
have  a powerful  impact  on money  demand.3  A 1 percent  rise  in a weighted 
average  of domestic  and import  prices  produces  a 0.72 percent  rise in de- 
posit demand  in that quarter  and a 1 percent  rise in the long run. Thus, 
during  recent  periods  when  import  prices  have  risen  by as much  as 10 per- 
cent in a quarter,  the demand for money has increased  significantly.4 
For a given  money  stock  these  surges  in money  demand  exert  upward  pres- 
sure  on interest  rates. 
The consumption  function  in the model  is 
(2)  N  =  b  a +  Edp  N  +  0.054 
N  i-=O  i 
=Oi  __  -cnVi  PCOnlN' 
where 
bo =  0.10,  E  =  0.66; and do =  0.016,  di =  0.054. 
i  i 
Real per  capita  consumption  (con/N) depends  on a distributed  lag on real 
3. A similar  adjustment  for imports is not necessary  for the currency  equation be- 
cause it uses the value of consumer  expenditures,  which include import prices, as the 
transactions  variable. The currency  equation is not shown because, except for this 
difference,  it is basically  of the same form as the demand  deposits  equation. 
4. A 10 percent  increase  in the price of imports  would raise the value of GNP plus 
imports by about 1 percent.  Thus, given interest  rates, deposit demand will rise by 1 
percent  in the long run. Currency  demand  also has a unitary  elasticity  with respect  to 
prices in the long run, but it is based on personal consumption  expenditures,  which 
constitute  about two-thirds  of GNP. Thus, currency  demand will rise by 1.5 percent 
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per capita  disposable  income (Yd/N), a distributed  lag on the common 
stock  portion  (VCW)  of real  per  capita  consumer  net worth,  and the value 
of the  remaining  portion  of net worth  (VOW)  at the  beginning  of the quar- 
ter.  The coefficients  indicate  that a rise  in the price  of consumption  goods 
(PC,,)  will  have  a sizable  effect  on real  consumption  through  the reduction 
in real  disposable  income  and  real  net worth.  The very  short  lag for VOW 
is troublesome  and its implications  will be analyzed  below. 
Wage-price  interactions  are a key vehicle  through  which  external  infla- 
tionary  shocks  are  transmitted  to the economy.  We shall  discuss  the wage- 
price  sector  in considerable  detail  because  we have reestimated  the wage 
equation,  and its properties  are rather  different  from  those in the conven- 
tional  MPS  model.5  We shall  also attempt  to isolate  those  variables  in the 
wage-price  sector  that will be most important  for the outcome  of the full- 
economy  simulations  that follow. 
THE WAGE EQUATION 
The wage  equation  is a modified  Phillips  curve  in which  the percentage 
changes  of wages  (PL),  measured  by compensation  per manhour  in non- 
farm private  domestic  business,  varies  inversely  with the unemployment 
rate (UL) and directly  with the percentage  change  in consumption  goods 
prices  (Pc,0),  the level  of social  security  and  unemployment  taxes  (SS), and 
the percentage change of the minimum wage (Pmin). The estimated equa- 
tion  is 
(3)  -0PL  0031  1  0017  UL +0004SS+0.009 
/pnin 
PL_  =  .31J  UL1  Pmin-1 
0.99  12  1  O.87 APconl  00 
+  0 j99 3  O.  0.87i  P  1  0.007D  -  0.00005, 
5',  0.87  con_i-10 
where  wage  increases  are  measured  as percentage  annual  rates  and D is a 
dummy  variable  to capture  the wage freeze  in 1971:4 and wage release 
in 1972:  1. 
The initial impact of the increase  in the price of consumption  goods 
(Pcon)  on the growth  of wages  is small  but in the long run  consumer  prices 
will rise almost proportionately  to wages, given the unemployment  rate. 
5. George de Menil and Jared  J. Enzler,  "Prices  and Wages  in the FRB-MIT-Penn 
Econometric  Model,"  in Otto Eckstein  (ed.),  The Econometrics of Price  Determination 
(Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1970). 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Thus, the wage equation  used in this study does not allow a significant 
tradeoff  in the long run  between  inflation  and the unemployment  rate.  Be- 
cause  the long-run  coefficient  on the rate of change  of prices  is essentially 
unity, attempts  to reduce  unemployment  below its "natural"  rate ulti- 
mately  will  fuel  an explosive  increase  in the rate  of inflation.  This  property, 
and  some  others  that  will  be discussed  below,  calis  for a  justification  of this 
wage  equation. 
In the light of recent  work  by such researchers  as Robert  Gordon  and 
George  Perry,6  our equation  may seem to lag the current  state  of the art. 
Working  within  the context  of a large  econometric  model,  however,  poses 
problems  for  the  construction  of a single  sector.  Thus,  explanatory  variables 
endogenous  to the economic  system  cannot  be employed  unless  equations 
for  those  variables  can  be produced.  For this  reason  the fixed-weight  unem- 
ployment  rate  by age and sex that Perry  uses as the labor  market  variable 
is difficult  to incorporate.  We encounter  similar  difficulties  with Gordon's 
formulation  of the dependent  variable  in the wage  equation  as a series  on 
hourly  earnings  corrected  for changes  in overtime  and interindustry  em- 
ployment  shifts. 
Equally  important  is the need  to strike  a compromise  between  the ability 
to explain  an individual  sector  and the ability  to track  the entire  system. 
Although  most equations  in the MPS  model  are  estimated  by single-equa- 
tion methods,  the best-fitting  form of an estimated  equation  clearly  is not 
always  the ultimate  best choice. The effects  that various  alternative  esti- 
mates  of a particular  equation  have  on the tracking  properties  of the model 
and on its responses  to various  kinds of shocks are important  criteria. 
These  properties  can be tested  only by simulation. 
One  of the  most  vexing  questions  in this  regard  is the size  of the  long-run 
coefficient  on the price  term  in the wage  equation.  Until recently  the best- 
fitting  equations  of the type presented  here  had estimated  long-run  coeffi- 
cients substantially  less than unity.  According  to these equations,  a con- 
siderable  tradeoff  between  unemployment  and inflation  was possible  even 
in the long  run.  Once  the 1969-71  experience  is added  to the sample  period, 
however,  the estimated  price coefficient  usually increases  markedly  to 
about unity.  Furthermore,  the average  lag for the price term in most of 
these  equations  is remarkably  short. 
Gordon  has demonstrated  that the wage equations  using the concepts 
6. George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA (3:1970), pp. 
411-41; Robert J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve," 
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developed  by Perry,  noted above,  do not yield a high long-run  coefficient 
for price  change  even  when  estimated  through  1970.7  In the course  of esti- 
mation,  we tried  to approximate  the effect  of Perry's  hypothesis  concerning 
composition  of the unemployment  rate  by adding  to the wage equation  a 
number  of variables  designed  to capture  this  effect.  The  proportion  of teen- 
agers  in the adult  population  was  tested  and  consistently  yielded  the wrong 
sign.  The proportion  of persons  aged  20-24 years  had the correct  sign but 
was  statistically  insignificant,  and  the coefficient  was so small  that  this  vari- 
able  could  account  for only negligible  shifts  in the Phillips  curve.  We tried 
entering  children  under  5 years  as a percent  of the adult  population,  on the 
theory  that when  the birth  rate is high, female  participation  rates  are low 
and a given  unemployment  rate  should  put greater  downward  pressure  on 
wage changes.  This variable  consistently  had the right sign but was very 
weak. Most important,  none of these variables,  either alone or in com- 
bination,  had  a noticeable  effect  on the price  coefficient.  We were  unable  to 
estimate  a wage equation  with a long-run  coefficeint  below 0.8. 
We also tried Gordon's  suggestion  of a flexible  price coefficient  that 
depends  on the rate  of inflation.8  We attempted  to estimate  equations  with 
two price  variables,  a short  distributed  lag on the total rate of increase  in 
consumer  prices and a longer distributed  lag on the excess of inflation 
above  some  threshold.  This  formulation  introduced  a kink  in the long-run 
Phillips  curve.  When  the threshold  was high, the sum of the price  coeffi- 
cients  always  exceeded  0.8 and  the threshold  variable  itself  was not signifi- 
cant. When  the threshold  was lowered,  the threshold  variable  became  sig- 
nificant  and the sum of the coefficients  rose to approximately  unity. Al- 
though  this specification  worked  well in estimation,  the full model  proved 
to be highly  unstable  when  simulated  with  this sort of equation.  When  the 
long-run  coefficient  on prices  is near unity and when the lag on prices  is 
short,  errors  in other  equations  quickly  cumulate  to large  errors  in wages 
and prices.9  We then experimented  with forcing  longer  price  lags into the 
wage  equation  and  finally  settled  on equation  (3), which  uses  a single  expo- 
nential  lag based  on 0.87; that is, roughly  16 percent- 
( 0.87 




9. This unstable  process  will occur  before  the higher  prices  can force up interest  rates 
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-of  an increase  in P60n  in the previous  quarter  is translated  into a wage  in- 
crease  in the current  quarter  and the weights  decline  exponentially  there- 
after  as powers  of 0.87. It was possible  to introduce  the longer  lag with a 
modest  loss in fit. The best-fitting  equation  we estimated  has a standard 
error  of about 1.3 percent  per quarter  at annual  rates  compared  to 1.4 in 
equation  (3). These  errors  are  only slightly  larger  than  those  found  in other 
studies  despite  the fact that the equation  uses the relatively  erratic  series 
on compensation  per manhour.  The average  lag implied by the 0.87 
coefficient  is 4.9 quarters. 
This modification  produced  a wage equation  that seemed  more in ac- 
cordance  with our observations  on the dynamics  of wage determination. 
We were  also comforted  by the improvement  in the full-model  simulations 
when  this equation  was used,  in the sense  that the results  accorded  better 
with our a priori  expectations  concerning  the reaction  of the economy  to 
shocks.  The longer  lag on prices  gives  the system  time  to react  and to cor- 
rect  any  errors  in simulated  prices.  Not surprisingly,  as  the  length  of the  price 
lag  is extended,  the size  of the coefficient  on the inverse  of unemployment  is 
increased.  In the estimated  equations  using  short  price  lags, the unemploy- 
ment coefficient  is about one-half  of that reported  in equation  (3). Thus, 
the size of the coefficient  and the length of the price lag have offsetting 
effects  and the reaction  of the wage-price  system  to changes  in the unem- 
ployment  rate  is not very  different  when  the length  of the lag on the price 
term is altered.  Lengthening  the lag strengthens  the initial impact of a 
given  change  of the unemployment  rate on the rate  of wage  increases,  but 
wages  will  react  more  slowly  to the price  increase.  Lengthening  the lag does 
moderate  the volatility  of the wage-price  system  in response  to other in- 
fluences,  such as an increase  in unfilled  orders  or productivity.  Thus,  the 
longer  lag form  makes  the full model  more stable. 
This discussion  emphasizes  the uncertainties  inherent  in modeling  the 
wage  process.  The structure  of the wage equation  is obviously  important 
to the question  we are addressing.  Yet a considerable  number  of hypoth- 
eses about  the structure  of the wage-price  sector  fit the facts  about  equally 
well, but carry  different  implications  for the impact  of changes  in the full 
model of the economy.  This is obviously  a source  of concern. 
Figure  1 shows  dynamic  simulations  of the percentage  changes  of wages 
using actual  values of the explanatory  variables,  including  prices,  in the 
wage  equation.  A four-quarter  annual  percentage  change,  100(PL,-PLX4)/ 
(PL,-4),  was constructed  in order  to smooth out fluctuations  in the actual 0- 
p  4  ~  ~  ~  ~  CC.~ 
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data that would  make  the chart  difficult  to read.  The wage equation  per- 
forms  quite  well over  the period,  but, surprisingly,  shows  little or no effect 
of the wage-price  control  program  once the slowdown  in prices  is allowed 
for, as it is in this simulation.  This finding  suggests  that the only influence 
controls  had on wages  was  the indirect  if powerful  one  asserted  through  the 
downward  pressure  on prices.10  This finding  is not simply  the result of 
estimating  the wage  equation  over  the period  that included  the price  con- 
trol  episode.  In the  simulations  of dozens  of different  wage  equations,  either 
using  dummy  variables  for the control  period  or ending  the sample  period 
in 1971:2,  we have never  found any evidence  of a direct  effect  on wages 
other  than in the freeze  quarter  1971:4. 
THE PRICE EQUATION 
The price  equation  in the model  is 
(4)  ln Pf  =  0.2901 ln PL +  0.073  EPD  -0.040  UOPD-1 
-  0.001 TIME -  0.0075  E  ln 
i=0  Mul_ 
Pr  -0.013  In p  +  0.710 ln Pn,1 
The equation  can be viewed  as expressing  prices  (private  nonfarm  deflator 
net of excise  taxes,  Pnf)  as a markup  over labor costs (PL).11  The markup 
varies  positively  with  the ratio of unfilled  orders  of producers'  durables  to 
shipments  (UOPD/EPD),  which  serves  as a measure  of capacity  utilization; 
negatively  with  a productivity  time  trend;  and  negatively  (but  weakly)  with 
cyclical  variation  in output  per  manhour  (ynf/MH) around  its trend.  The 
markup  also varies  negatively  with  the change  in raw  material  prices  (Prm) 
as an impact  variable.  The  nonfarm  business  sector  now accounts  for 85 to 
90 percent  of real GNP. Government  is excluded  because  the "price"  of 
government  is really  a wage,  and  farm  output  is excluded  because  it is sub- 
ject to forces,  such as weather,  that we cannot  explain  in economic  terms. 
10. For a similar  result,  see Robert J. Gordon, "The Response of Wages  and Prices 
to the First Two Years of Controls,"  BPEA (3:1973), pp. 765-78. 
11. Since it determines  the relationship  between prices and wages and since labor 
requirements  are determined  elsewhere  in the model, the equation also determines  the 
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The nonfarm  deflator  is a value-added  deflator;  that  is, it is calculated  as 
a weighted  average  of the prices  of business  output  less a weighted  average 
of the prices of the raw  materials  businesses  buy. For the business  sector 
as a whole, the raw material  inputs  consist mainly  of imports  and farm 
products.  If prices of these raw materials  increases,  and the cost is not 
passed along to final consumers,  the nonfarm  business  deflator  actually 
falls. Because  of this phenomenon,  changes  in raw materials  prices  (Pm,) 
enter  the deflator  equation  with  a negative  sign.  This  term  has only a tran- 
sitory effect,  however,  as these changes  are eventually  passed  on to con- 
sumers.  Finally,  the equation  has a lagged  dependent  variable  with a co- 
efficient  indicating  that  if any of the determinants  of the price  level  change, 
about  30 percent  of the complete  price  adjustment  is made  in one quarter. 
Figure  2 shows  a dynamic  simulation  of the price  equation  using  actual 
values  of the right-hand  variables,  except  for the lagged  dependent  variable 
which  takes  on the  predicted  value  from  the previous  quarter.  The equation 
performs  quite  well  until  1971:  3, when  it begins  to simulate  prices  too high, 
which  suggests  that  the price  control  program  has had a dampening  effect 
on the price  level.  It should  be stressed  that  the simulation  does  not capture 
the full effect  of the price  controls  on the price  level.  We argue  below  that 
if price  controls  had not been imposed,  the higher  prices  that would  have 
ensued  would  have  led to higher  wages  and  then  to even  higher  prices.  This 
interaction  of wages  and  prices  considerably  enlarges  the effect  of controls 
that appears  in Figure  2. 
Closing  the wage-price  sector  calls for three  identities: 
(5)  Pcnd  UcndPnf 
(6)  Pcd 
=  UcdPnf 
(7)  Pp  _cndPCnd  +  0.OlPCd(WCD +  O.O1RCB.KCd) 
con  - 
Cnd  +  (WCD  +  0.0379Kcd) 
Equation  (5) relates  the deflator  for consumer  nondurables  and services 
(Pcnd)  to the nonfarm  business  deflator  by the ratio U6nd. Equation  (6) does 
the same  for  the  consumer  durable  deflator  (PCd)  using  the ratio UCd. Actual 
historical  values for these ratios were used in each quarter.  We do not 
attempt  to explain  these ratios,  since they depend  in large part on three 
items  for which  behavioral  equations  are  difficult  to construct:  the price  of 
imported  goods,  the price  of farm  products,  and  the federal  excise  tax rate. 
The consumption  price  deflator  (P0on)  is defined  as a weighted  average  of 
the price of nondurables  and the price of the services  of durables.  It is 00 
0) 
/~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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determined  in equation  (7) as the ratio of the sum of (1) current-dollar 
purchases  of consumer  nondurables  and services  (Cnd Pcnd)  and (2) current- 
dollar  consumption  of the services  of the stock of durable  goods,  to the  sum 
of Cnd  and the consumption  (in 1958  dollars)  of the services  of the stock of 
durable  goods. The term PCd(WCD  +  0.01RCB KCd)  measures  the im- 
puted  rental  services  from  durable  goods in current  dollars,  where  WCD is 
the depreciation  on consumer  durables  and K,d  is the stock of consumer 
durables,  both in 1958  dollars,  and  RCB is the current  interest  rate  on cor- 
porate  bonds. The expression  (WCD +  0.0379KCd)  measures  the imputed 
services  from  durables  in 1958  dollars,  where  0.0379  is the average  value  of 
RCB in 1958. 
INTERACTION  OF WAGES AND  PRICES 
How does the wage-price  sector,  considered  in isolation  from  the rest  of 
the full model, respond  to an increase  in consumption  prices?  Wages  will 
rise in response  to this shock,  and spur  a further  increase  in prices.  But if 
unemployment  is unchanged  and if the long-run  price coefficient  in the 
wage  equation  is less  than  unity,  these  feedbacks  will  not accumulate  indefi- 
nitely.  In this case, the rate of price  increase  will eventually  return  to what 
it would  have  been  in the absence  of the shock,  although  the level of prices 
will be higher.  If, however,  the long-run  coefficient  is unity,  this feedback 
mechanism  will continue  without  end, and the rate of inflation  will be 
permanently  higher,  but by only a limited  amount  even in this case. For 
inflation  to increase  without  limit requires  a permanent  reduction  in the 
unemployment  rate. 
In order  to study  the adjustment  of the wage-price  sector  in response  to 
an external  price  shock,  we did two simulations  of the sector  for the seven- 
year  period  1967  through  1973.  In the first,  the sector  was simulated  as is. 
In the second,  the ratio of the consumer  nondurable  deflator  to the non- 
farm  business  deflator  (U,fnd of equation  5) was increased  by 1 percent  in 
the first quarter  of the simulation  (raising  PC0n  by an annual  rate of 3.44 
percent  that quarter)  and held at the new higher  level  to capture  the effect 
of a permanent  rise in the price level of a commodity  like imported  oil. 
The effects of this permanent  increase  in Ucnd  on the rate of change of 
wages,  the nonfarm  deflator,  and PC0n  are measured  by the difference  be- 
tween  the two simulations,  and are reported  in Table  2. 
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Table  2. Simulated  Effect  on the Wage-Price  Sector  of a 
Rise in Consumption  Prices,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation  in annual  percent  rate of change 
Private  nonfarm 
deflator  net of  Consumption  price 
Quarter  of  Compensation  excise taxes  deflator 
simulation  per manhour  Pf  Pcon 
1  0.00  0.00  3.44 
2  0.54  0.16  0.15 
3  0.50  0.26  0.24 
4  0.47  0.32  0.30 
5  0.45  0.36  0.36 
6  0.46  0.38  0.38 
7  0.46  0.40  0.41 
8  0.46  0.42  0.41 
12  0.49  0.46  0.46 
16  0.42  0.44  0.43 
20  0.43  0.43  0.44 
24  0.42  0.42  0.43 
28  0.41  0.41  0.42 
Source: Simulations in which the ratio of the consumer nondurable deflator to the nonfarm business 
deflator is held 1 percent above historical values in each quarter of the simulations. See text for detailed 
discussion. 
3.44  percent  annual  rate  in the  first  quarter  of the simulation  without  affect- 
ing compensation  per manhour  or domestic  nonfarm  prices, since Peon 
enters  the wage  equation  only with a lag. In the second  quarter  the rate of 
wage change  rises  by about one-half  percent  (at annual  rates)  and prices 
by about one-sixth  percent.  The feedbacks  between  these equations  con- 
tinue and eventually  the rate of increase  of both prices  and wages settles 
at a level about  0.4 percent  above  that in the simulation  without  the price 
disturbance. 
These results obtain, of course, only in a wage-price sector in isolation. 
Table 2 can be regarded  as an approximation to what would happen in the 
full system  only  if monetary  and fiscal  policy  were  managed  in such a way 
as to offset the effects of the price disturbance on unemployment, the ratio 
of unfilled orders to shipments, and productivity. If policy were not so ac- 
commodating, the rise in prices would drive interest rates up, production 
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on prices.  In fact, if the money stock were not expanded,  output would 
have  to remain  at a reduced  level  until  both the  level  and  the rate  of change 
of prices  returned  to the values  they  would  have  attained  in the absence  of 
the original  disturbance  in prices. 
There  is reason  to suspect  that wages  may  be less responsive  to external 
price  shocks  than  this  model  indicates.  We do not know exactly  what role 
the  rate  of change  of prices  plays  in the  wage  equation.  If it captures  changes 
in the bargaining  position  of labor,  a rise  in import  prices  will  have  weaker 
effects  than  one in domestic  prices  because  the value  of the marginal  prod- 
uct of labor  will not have  risen.  Furthermore,  to the extent  that the coeffi- 
cient represents  wage  earners'  expectations  of future  inflation,  one might 
question  whether  an increase  in prices  due  to something  like the formation 
of a cartel  by the oil-producing  countries  would be extrapolated  in the 
manner  the price  term  indicates.  After  all, the industry  cannot  be cartelized 
more  than  once.  To the extent  that wage  earners  are  aware  of the  source  of 
the initial  rise  in price,  they  may  not react  as strongly  as the wage  equation 
implies. 
In a similar  vein,  it has been  argued  that  expectations  are  based  not only 
on past values  of the variable  in question,  but also on knowledge  of the 
structure  of the economic  system  and of the reactions  of policy makers. 
Suppose  people  expect  the authorities  to increase  the unemployment  rate 
to, say,  6 percent  and  hold it there  whenever  inflation  exceeded  some  maxi- 
mum  acceptable  value.  When  this point is reached,  individuals  would  rea- 
son that the authorities  would  not allow this situation  to continue  indefi- 
nitely,  but would  act to reduce  the inflation  rate  slowly.  In this case, price 
expectations  would  not depend  upon previous  prices  alone, as they do in 
the wage  equation  used  here. 
The Effects  of External  Shocks  on the Economy  as a Whole 
In this and  the next  section  we report  simulations  of the full MPS  model 
to analyze  the  effects  of two  price  shocks  to the  economy:  cartelization  in  the 
foreign  oil-producing  countries  and the application  of price  controls.  The 
emphasis  will  be on the interaction  among  the sectors  of the economy,  and 
on determining  the  pressures  that  would  develop,  under  the  assumption  that 
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posits),  does not respond  to the shock. Fiscal policy, too, is assumed  to 
remain  unchanged.12 
The  degree  to which  policy  should  adjust  to each  of these  shocks  depends 
upon  one's  preferences  concerning  the  tradeoff  between  unemployment  and 
inflation.  We have nothing  to add to this debate.  In a later  section,  how- 
ever,  we do discuss  the impact of an "accommodating"  monetary  policy 
on the initial  effects  of a rise  in oil prices. 
In carrying  out the experiments,  we first simulated  each of the model 
equations  separately  using actual  values of the right-hand  variables,  and 
recorded  the errors  for each  equation  for each  quarter.  Next, we simulated 
the equations  simultaneously  in the full  model  using  values  of the variables 
that were  calculated  by the model on the right-hand  side, adding  in each 
quarter  the error  made  by that equation  when  it was simulated  separately. 
Because  each equation  simulated  in this manner  tracks  the actual  values 
exactly,  the system  tracks  exactly.  In the third  simulation  we entered  some 
disturbance  (for example,  a change  in the price of oil) and measured  its 
effect  by noting  the difference  between  the second and third  simulations. 
This procedure  has two advantages.  First, because  the model is non- 
linear,  its responses  vary  with the conditions  under  which  the response  is 
tested.  Feeding  the errors  into each equation  permits  a test near  historical 
values of the endogenous  variables  even in the face of serious  equation 
errors.  Second,  and  equally  important,  it allows  us to modify  various  equa- 
tions arbitrarily  and still remain  near  historical  values  of the relevant  en- 
dogenous  variables.  Otherwise  it would  be necessary  to reestimate  the  equa- 
tions  involved. 
An example  should demonstrate  the importance  of this procedure  for 
modifying  the model's  structure.  Suppose  that we have measured  the re- 
sponse of the system  to a change  in the money stock. We now wish to 
know  how the system  would  have  reacted  to the same  change  if the interest 
12. We defined  an unchanged  fiscal policy as consisting of (1) unchanged  tax rates 
(tax collections  are allowed  to vary with income),  (2) unchanged  constant-dollar  federal 
purchases  (current-dollar  purchases of  goods move proportionally to  the nonfarm 
business deflator, and employee compensation moves proportionally  to the private 
compensation  rate), and (3) unchanged  current-dollar  transfer  payments.  The last of 
these assumptions  is debatable  in this context and so we repeated  some of the experi- 
ments using an assumption of unchanged constant-dollar  transfers, with negligible 
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elasticity  of demand  for money  were  half the value  specified  in the money 
demand  equation.  With  the interest  elasticity  coefficient  cut in half,  we sim- 
ulate the altered  money demand  equation  using actual variables  on the 
right-hand  side,  and  record  the error  for each  quarter  in place  of the errors 
arising  from the unaltered  equation.  Simulating  the new system  simulta- 
neously,  we add the new set of errors  to each equation  in each quarter. 
As in the test of the unaltered  system,  this second simulation  will track 
history  exactly.  In the third  simulation  we again  change  the money stock 
and note the difference  between  the second and third simulations.  We 
should  find  a greater  effect  on interest  rates  than  we found  in the unaltered 
system  since  now  interest  rates  will  need  to change  more  in order  to accom- 
modate  the changed  money  stock. This technique  can also be used to add 
a new  variable  arbitrarily  to an equation.  We shall  make  use of the  capacity 
to modify  the model  in these  ways  later  in this section  in order  to do sensi- 
tivity  analyses  with certain  important  parameters  in the model. 
CARTELIZATION  OF AN  IMPORT INDUSTRY 
We shall attempt  to estimate  the economic  impact of the increase  in 
crude  oil prices  from  about $3.50  to about $10 per barrel  that occurred  in 
1973  after  the formation  of the oil production  cartel.  We have  ignored  the 
effects  of the temporary  embargo  on oil shipments  to the United States, 
which,  while  sharp,  were  probably  not abiding. 
To some extent  the results  of the increase  in oil prices  will depend  on 
price and income  elasticities  of demand  that at this point are uncertain, 
on cross elasticities  of demand  between  energy  sources,  and on the exis- 
tence of backup energy  technologies  about which very little is known. 
Some  sweeping  assumptions  about  these  matters  are  necessary:  (1) that  the 
cartelization  will be permanent;  (2) that the cartel  will adjust  the dollar 
price of oil in response  to changes in the U.S. price level to maintain 
the relative  prices  of U.S. goods and oil; (3) that the price elasticity  of 
demand  for oil is low; (4) that the suppliers  of imported  oil are willing  to 
take financial  claims in payment  and not spend them for U.S. exports. 
We also assume  a world  of floating  exchange  rates  in which  both import 
and export prices move proportionately  with the domestic nonfarm 
business  deflator.  In this case a general  inflation  has no price effects  on 
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real  income  on import  demand  remains  in force.  Finally,  we assume  away 
all third-country  effects. 
Because  of technical  difficulties  in simulating  events  into the relatively 
distant  future,  and because  we wished  to use the error  coding procedure 
described  earlier  when altering  the structure  of the model, we moved 
cartelization  and the oil crisis back to the beginning  of  1967.13  This 
procedure  allows  us to simulate  the effects  of the oil case for seven  years, 
which is probably  much longer than several  of our assumptions  could 
be maintained.14 
A necessary  first  step in the analysis  is to determine  the initial impact 
of the increase  in prices  of imported  oil on U.S. prices.  In principle  we 
could calculate  how much this increase  adds to the current  bills for im- 
ports and for final goods and raise the various  price deflators  for 1967 
accordingly.  However,  this procedure  cannot be used for different  com- 
ponents of final output because  we do not have complete  information 
about  how the increase  is distributed  among  the price  deflators  for various 
products.  Clearly,  consumer  nondurables  and services  bear  the brunt  of it. 
In addition  to the substantial  portion  of petroleum  used by private  auto- 
mobiles,  much  of the product  of industries  that  rely  heavily  on petroleum, 
such as air transport  and electric  utilities,  falls into these categories.  For 
simplicity  we assume  that all of the increase  in import  prices  is initially 
reflected  in these sectors.  On this assumption,  the deflator  for consumer 
nondurables  and services  would  rise by about 2 percent.  Since  the value- 
added deflator  (Praf) is not affected  directly,  we altered equation  (5) by 
increasing  UCf,d  by 2 percent  above its historical  value.15 
In fact,  oil prices  did  not rise  to their  ultimate  level  all at once.  Moreover, 
since the simultaneous  embargo  on shipments  to the United States by 
some producer  countries  reduced  the quantity  of imported  oil, the initial 
direct  effect  of the higher  world  prices  for crude  oil on the domestic  price 
level was less severe  than the above calculations  imply.  To allow for this 
we phased  in the upward  adjustment  in equal  increments  over  three  quar- 
13. Economic conditions obviously were not the same in 1967 as they are in 1974. 
Some evidence on the importance of initial conditions for the simulation results is 
discussed  below. 
14. Several  of the equations  use nominal  interest  rates prior  to 1967  and real  interest 
rates thereafter,  so an earlier  starting  date was not feasible. 
15. Then, since we wanted  the deflator  for domestically  produced  nondurable  goods 
(Pcndcnd -  PimiM) to be unaffected  by the oil price  increase,  we calculated  the value of 
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ters,  with  the ratio Und maintained  2 percent  higher  in every  quarter  there- 
after. 
These procedures  still leave the problem  of pricing  domestic  oil and 
substitutes  and of distributing  this price increase  by final product. By 
mid-1974,  the average  price of domestic  oil had risen about $3 a barrel 
in the wake  of the rise  in the  price  of imported  oil. Domestic  price  controls, 
of course, contained  the rise, and once the furor over petroleum  prices 
subsides,  oil producers  will probably  be able  to exact  prices  that are  closer 
to world levels. The rise in domestic  oil prices  causes an increase  in the 
nonfarm  business  deflator  relative  to wages,  and  in the profit  share  of total 
output.  The prices  of oil substitutes  have also risen.  The price  of coal has 
risen  substantially  (as would  the price  of natural  gas in the absence  of regu- 
lation). These effects  should also increase  the price level and the profit 
share  in these  industries. 
But even if the prices  of oil and other  energy  sources  go up and remain 
high, the share  of profits  in gross  national  product  might  not rise, except 
in the short  run,  by as much  as the crude  figures  on oil revenues  suggest. 
Expanded  domestic  production  of oil, coal, and natural  gas, along with 
the development  of other  energy  sources,  would have a depressing  effect 
on both foreign  and domestic  oil prices. Not only will there be a sub- 
stitution  away from oil products  to other energy  products  and to other 
expenditures  but in the long run  resources  will be attracted  by high  profits 
until the marginal,  if not the average,  productivity  of capital in the oil 
industry  recedes  to approximately  that of other industries.  Thus, in the 
long run  the profit  share  in GNP will tend  to return  to the value  it would 
have  had in the absence  of cartelization.  However,  we believe  that oil pro- 
ducers  will  be more  likely  to be able  to maintain  the higher  profitability  of 
their  industry  than will other  import-competing  goods industries.  Our  be- 
lief rests  on the fact  that  larger  profits  are  really  a rent  of oil wells  and  that 
the rental  price  can remain  high even though  induced  investment  reduces 
the marginal  product  of capital  in this industry. 
Clearly,  many of these  issues  are more  political  and technological  than 
economic,  and we are forced  to fall back on assumption.  We assume  (1) 
that the world  price  of oil remains  at its new level of $10, and (2) that the 
increase  in the profit  share  brought  about  by a rise  in the average  price of 
domestic  crude oil from about $3.50 to $6.30 per barrel  is permanent. 
Further  expansion  in the profit share, arising  from the higher price of 
domestic  petroleum  substitutes  and deregulation  of both domestic  crude 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
oil and its substitutes,  is assumed  to be offset by heavier  investment  in 
energy  industries  and  the development  of new  technologies.  In the present 
state of the world,  these assumptions  could be outdated  within  weeks. 
The next step is to approximate  the impact  of the increases  in domestic 
oil prices  on the relevant  price  deflators.  The increase  in the dollar  value  of 
domestic  crude  oil production  is the equivalent  of  just over 1 percent  of the 
current-dollar  value of nonfarm  domestic  business  output in 1973:4.16 
To account  for the assumed  response  of domestic  oil prices,  we adjusted 
the nonfarm  business deflator  equation  so that the deflator  was 1 per- 
cent higher relative to  factor costs than was the case in the control 
simulations. 
Like  the prices  of imported  oil, those of domestic  oil will not reach  their 
new level all at once; furthermore,  some time will elapse between the 
rise  in the prices  of imported  oil and the increase  in the prices  to the final 
consumers  of products  made from it. To approximate  this combination 
of factors,  we adjusted  the price  equation  upward  by only 0.5 percent  in 
the initial  quarter,  then gradually  increased  the adjustment  to 1 percent.'7 
Raising  the prices  of both domestic  and imported  oil increases  the de- 
flators  for consumer  nondurables  and services  3 percent  relative  to wages 
when  the phased-in  adjustments  are  complete.  The  price  of general  govern- 
ment holds relative  to wages, and the product  prices of the remaining 
sectors  of the economy  rise 1 percent  relative  to wages. 
Implicit  in these  adjustments  to the deflators  are  assumptions  concerning 
various  elasticities  of demand  for petroleum  products  and of supply of 
domestic  oil. Are these elasticities  reasonable?  In the eight years  ending 
in 1973, annual  consumption  of petroleum  products  rose just under 50 
percent,  from  3,749  million  to 5,617  million  barrels.  Assume  that  the same 
rate  of increase  would  have  continued  had  it not been  for  the increase  in oil 
16. Projected  production  of domestic  crude oil for early 1974 was about 11 million 
barrels  per day, which at $3.50 per barrel  is valued at $14.1 billion per year. At $6.30 
per  barrel,  the value  would  be $25.3  billion per  year.  In the fourth  quarter  of 1973  private 
nonfarm domestic output was $1,073 billion. Increasing  this total by  $11.2 billion 
(25.3-14.1) while leaving real output unchanged  would increase  the domestic  nonfarm 
price  deflator  by slightly over 1 percent. 
17. The adjustment  was made by adding to equation (4) a constant 0.005 in the 
initial quarter  of the high-oil-price  simulations  and 0.003 in each quarter  thereafter. 
Since  the coefficient  of the lagged dependent  variable  is 0.7, the adjustment  approaches 
0.003/(1.O-0.7) = 0.01, or 1 percent  since the equation  is in logarithms. James  L. Pierce and  Jared  J. Enzler  35 
prices.  Further  assume  that consumer  nondurables  and services  and non- 
farm business output grow on average  at the long-run  natural  rate of 
growth  of the economy  (around  3.5 percent  per year)-that is, about 32 
percent  in the same period.  Our  import  price  adjustment  of 2 percent  in 
UC,,  is correct only if the proportion  of imported  oil in total real con- 
sumption of nondurables  and services  remains  constant; our domestic 
price adjustment  of 1 percent  in Pnf is correct  only if domestic  oil pro- 
duction is a constant proportion  of nonfarm  business output. For all 
these  assumptions  to be met,  both imported  oil consumption  and  domestic 
oil production  must also increase  by 32 percent  over the period. Thus, 
we have implicitly  assumed  that the quantity  of oil consumed  will be 
reduced by  12.0 percent over the next eight years-that  is, from 150 
percent of its 1973 level to  132 percent.  We estimate  the average  final 
sale price of petroleum  products  in 1973  to be roughly  30 cents per gal- 
lon; the price increases  we are assuming  will raise the average  retail 
value  by 10 cents  per gallon,  or 33 percent.  The assumed  long-run  (eight- 
year) price elasticity  of demand  is then -  12/33, or about -0.36.  This 
figure  is perhaps  a bit on the low side, but not improbable. 
Next, is the assumption  of a rate of growth of domestic  petroleum 
output of about 3.5 percent  reasonable?  Domestic production  actually 
declined  slightly  between  1970  and 1973  and if the world  price  of oil had 
not risen,  the decline  would  probably  have accelerated.  Thus our assump- 
tions imply a  sizable price effect on  domestic production. Imported 
petroleum,  on the other  hand, grew  at about a 12 percent  annual  rate in 
the eight years ended in 1973. Our assumptions  imply that this rate of 
growth  drops to about 3.5 percent,  which again is a substantial  effect. 
The oil price  increase  would also be expected  to stimulate  investment. 
For a time capital  expenditures  will be necessary  to expand  domestic  oil 
output, to develop  new energy  resources,  to expand production  of pe- 
troleum  substitutes,  and to adopt energy-saving  technology.  We do not 
know the magnitudes  of these effects  and have not attempted  to change 
the investment  function  to account for them. The function does allow 
investment  to respond  to changes  in output and the cost of capital in 
response  to the rise  in oil prices. 
The assumptions  we have had to make are more likely to  hold in 
the short run than over a longer  period of years. Small  errors  in the as- 
sumed demand  and supply elasticities  will loom large with the passage 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table 3.  Simulated  Economic Impact of the 1973 Increase in Oil Prices, 
by Selected Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation 
Conswnp-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion  ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  0.1  -2.5  -2.7  -5.5  0.1  0.3 
2  -3.1  -6.0  -5.3  -10.2  0.4  0.3 
3  -7.2  -10.0  -8.3  -14.7  0.6  0.3 
4  -10.4  -13.4  -10.4  -16.4  0.9  0.2 
5  -13.4  -16.4  -12.4  -18.2  1.1  0.1 
6  -16.4  -19.1  -14.3  -20.0  1.3  0.0 
7  -18.6  -20.8  -15.8  -21.4  1.5  -0.1 
8  -20.0  -21.5  -16.9  -22.7  1.6  -0.2 
12  -16.2  -15.2  -17.2  -23.9  1.5  -0.2 
16  -21.6  -14.4  -18.2  -24.7  1.7  -0.3 
20  -33.7  -15.1  -17.4  -25.4  1.8  -0.7 
24  -57.3  -19.5  -18.6  -28.3  2.1  -1.2 
28  -75.5  -12.9  -17.1  -28.1  1.9  -2.4 
Source: Simulations  covering the 1967-73 period; the price of oil rises from $3.50 to $10.00 per barrel  for 
imports and to $6.30 per barrel for domestic production, as described in the text, while the money supply 
and fiscal policy are unchanged from the control simulation. 
of time.  The  success  of the foreign  oil cartel  is harder  to predict  the further 
ahead one looks. And investment  response is likely to become more 
significant  after a period of time. For all these reasons,  the analysis  is 
probably  considerably  more reliable  for the near term than for several 
years  down  the road. 
SIMULATION  RESULTS 
The problem  has now been  defined  and we can turn  to a series  of simu- 
lation experiments  designed  to give quantitative  estimates  of the impacts 
of the rise in oil prices.  Table 3 shows the differences  between  the high- 
oil-price  and  control  simulations.  Initially,  the higher  oil prices  powerfully 
depress  income  and employment,  for several  reasons. 
First, the increase  in import prices alone, when fully passed on  to James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  37 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions  (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  cuirrent current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.4  1.2  4.2  0.2  2.7  1.2  18.6 
-0.3  0.0  2.1  3.1  0.3  5.2  0.1  16.7 
-0.2  0.1  2.9  2.5  0.3  7.3  -1.4  5.7 
0.1  0.4  3.0  0.5  0.4  6.7  -2.6  3.6 
0.1  0.0  3.1  0.2  0.4  6.4  -3.1  9.1 
-0.1  -0.2  3.2  0.0  0.4  6.1  -3.3  21.2 
-0.4  -0.4  3.2  -0.  1  0.5  6.0  -2.9  31.6 
-1.0  -0.6  3.2  -0.2  0.4  6.0  -1.7  56.5 
-3.6  -0.7  2.9  -0.4  0.4  7.2  7.9  99.2 
-6.0  -0.7  2.2  -0.8  -0.0  7.5  10.8  83.3 
-11.0  -1.2  0.8  -1.2  -0.6  7.3  12.9  84.0 
-19.0  -1.8  -1.3  -1.7  -1.9  5.3  13.5  62.4 
-30.7  -2.3  -4.5  -2.2  -4.9  4.4  27.3  92.4 
consumers,  reduces  real  disposable  income  by about 1.8  percent'8-equiv- 
alent in effect to a  12 percent  income tax surcharge  at 1973:4 levels 
of the relevant  magnitudes.  Second,  the increase  in prices  of domestic  oil 
further  depresses  real disposable  income by about 0.9 percent. Some 
of this loss will be returned  to individuals  in the form of dividends  and, 
therefore,  does not have quite the depressing  effect of the increase  in 
18. The 1.8 percent  is the proportion  by which current-dollar  disposable  income in 
1973:4 ($917.8 billion) would have had to rise to cover the increased  price of imported 
oil ($16.6 billion). This, like other direct  effects  discussed  here,  cannot be read from the 
tables. The figures  in the tables are the result of a simultaneous  solution of the full 
system.  The change  in disposable  income  reported  there  is a result  not only of the direct 
effect of the increase  in oil prices on disposable  income, but of indirect  effects  as well, 
since changed prices and real incomes lead first to changed production and then to 
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import prices. Moreover,  the higher domestic  prices will also enhance 
share  prices  and  reduce  the  costs  of capital,  thus  inducing  more  investment. 
Third,  the increased  prices  of imports  also diminish  the value  of house- 
hold net worth  measured  in terms  of consumer  goods. In the early  quar- 
ters of the simulation,  this accounts  for about $2 billion (1958 prices)  of 
the  reduced  consumption  in the simulation.  Fourth,  the increased  prices  for 
domestic  oil further  cut the real value of consumer  net worth;  again  the 
effects  are  not as severe  as those imposed  by higher  prices  for imports  be- 
cause  the  richer  profits  of oil companies  support  the  value  of the  corporate- 
share portion of consumer  net worth. Finally, once the phase-in  of oil 
prices  is complete,  the increase  in the value of transactions  raises  the de- 
mand  for money  by enough  to increase  the Treasury  bill rate  by 60 basis 
points.  These  five effects  combine  to exert  a powerful  downward  force on 
real output  and consumption. 
Unlike  most downward  shifts  in real  demand,  that  resulting  from  the in- 
crease  in oil prices  does  not lead quickly  to lower  interest  rates  for a given 
growth  in M1. In fact, the bill rate  is not significantly  lower  until the fifth 
year  of the simulation.  There  are  two reasons  for this  slow  reduction.  First, 
higher  prices  raise  the value of transactions,  and interest  rates  cannot  fall 
until  real  output  and prices  have dropped  sufficiently  to bring  the value  of 
transactions  below  the  levels  in the control  simulation.  Second,  the increase 
in prices  sets  up an interaction  that  keeps  compensation  per  manhour  up to 
around  its control levels for the first six quarters,  and holds consumer 
prices  above their control levels for five years. These higher  prices also 
support  interest  rates,  depriving  the system  for some  time  of the stabilizing 
effects  the financial  sector ordinarily  offers when real activity declines. 
Thus,  the multiplier-accelerator  process  is allowed  to go farther  than  usual. 
Given  our  assumptions  of unchanged  money  growth,  the  rate  of inflation 
eventually  must  return  to its original  level. This process  takes a very  long 
time to work  itself out. The rise in oil prices  raises  the overall  price  level 
above  a point  that  can be supported  by the existing  money  stock.  The cur- 
tailed  output  and unemployment  eventually  act to lower the rate  of infla- 
tion as the economy  tries  to squeeze  out the excess  in prices.  By the time  it 
succeeds,  however,  the annual  rate  of inflation  has been  reduced  by almost 
2 percent  and prices overshoot  the mark. At the end of the simulation 
period,  output  is recovering.19 
19. Real GNP is not down by nearly  as much as the 1.9 percent  higher unemploy- 
ment  rate would  imply, given Okun's  law. Among the reasons  for this development  two 
are especially  important:  (1) By the end of the simulation,  the product  of state and local James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  39 
This overshoot  of the price  level is surprising  at first  glance.  It is, how- 
ever, an almost  inescapable  result  of the standard  economic  model. Sup- 
pose we have an economic  system  growing  along  an equilibrium  path and 
for some reason  the price  level  is displaced  upward.  If the money  stock is 
not adjusted  to accommodate  this development,  interest  rates will rise, 
depressing  the level of real output.  In turn, unemployment  will rise, and 
begin  to restrain  the rate  of change  of wages  and prices.  As long as prices 
are too high (and therefore  output  and employment  too low) to be con- 
sistent  with the equilibrium  growth  path, the rate of change  of prices  will 
decline.  When  prices  finally  return  to the level they would  have occupied 
in the absence  of the disturbance,  their  rate of change  is too low and they 
overshoot.  The  process  then  reverses.  If the system  is stable,  both the level 
and the rate of change  of prices  will eventually  achieve  their equilibrium 
values.  There  is no guarantee  that this cyclical  mechanism  is stable, and 
in the MPS model,  it is barely  so. The model may not pinpoint  the time 
at which this price  overshoot  occurs,  but simulations  over a period  long 
enough for the overshoot  to occur serve to show how the adjustment 
works. 
Eventually  the inflation  rate, unemployment,  real output, and the bill 
rate must return  to the neighborhood  of their  control  levels.  Because  the 
value of transactions  has risen, nominal GNP, prices, and wages must 
settle somewhat  below control simulation  levels. The simulation  is not 
long enough  for all these  events  to work  themselves  out. 
The deflationary  power  of the oil crisis turns  out to be substantial.  In 
particular,  the reduction  in real  output  is sufficient  to restrain  wages  in the 
early quarters  of the simulation.  This sharp reaction could be exces- 
sive. If prices of consumer  goods increase,  is it reasonable  to believe 
that households  rapidly  adjust  their consumption  to the fall in the real 
value of their  assets,  as the model  predicts? 
TESTS OF SENSITIVITY 
To test the importance  of this factor  in the simulation  result,  we altered 
the reaction  of the consumption  function  to changes  in real  net worth.  In 
general  government  is lower and private  business  output is higher  in the case involving 
higher  oil prices.  Real output  per employee  is much higher  in the private  sector  than in 
the government  sector. (2) Labor productivity  in this model depends  positively on the 
level of capacity  utilization;  when  utilization  is high, overhead  employees  are used more 
effectively.  The lower real output  in the early  quarters  of the oil simulations  reduces  the 
ending  level of capacity  and raises  utilization  rates. 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
the first three years of the simulation, current-dollar  net worth excluding 
common  stocks (VOW) was virtually unchanged by the increase in  oil 
prices. Thereafter  it dropped slightly, with the reduction not reaching $50 
billion until the fifth year. Thus, nearly all the reduction in real net worth 
in the early part of the simulations is caused by higher prices of consumer 
goods. To test the contribution that the rapid response of real consump- 
tion to the reduction in real net worth made to the simulation results, we 
merely suspended  the term on VOW  in the consumption function by setting 
its  coefficient to  zero. This is  equivalent to  assuming that households 
never react to the fall in the real value of VOW. 
The results of this test are shown in Table 4. As  expected, the initial 
downward effect on consumption is mitigated, and the initial upward ef- 
fects on prices and wages are magnified. The differences are not  great, 
however. After a few quarters, Table 4 looks  much like Table 3. Also, 
Table  4. Simulated  Economic  Impact  of the Increase  in Oil Prices 
with  a Modified  Consumption  Function,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  1.3  -1.5  -1.6  -5.1  0.1  0.3 
2  0.2  -3.4  -3.1  -9.1  0.2  0.4 
3  -1.6  -6.1  -5.1  -12.9  0.4  0.6 
4  -3.4  -8.7  -6.7  -14.2  0.5  0.5 
5  -5.4  -11.5  -8.5  -15.7  0.7  0.5 
6  -7.7  -14.2  -10.2  -17.5  0.9  0.4 
7  -9.6  -16.2  -11.5  -18.9  1.1  0.4 
8  -10.8  -17.5  -12.6  -20.1  1.2  0.4 
12  -10.7  -16.7  -14.6  -23.0  1.4  0.5 
16  -14.9  -17.6  -16.4  -24.8  1.7  0.1 
20  -24.6  -19.8  -17.5  -27.0  2.0  -0.2 
24  -48.8  -27.5  -20.9  -32.7  2.5  -1.0 
28  -63.1  -20.5  -20.7  -34.0  2.5  -2.0 
Source: Simulations covering the 1967-73 period. Changes in real consumer net worth other than com- 
mon stocks are assumed to have no effect on consumption. Changes in oil prices and assumptions about 
policy are the same as those for Table 3. James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  41 
while the early effects are moderated by this change, the later effects are 
intensified. These shifts result because prices in this simulation have risen 
even farther above the level that can be supported by the existing money 
stock. 
Certainly the correct specification of the consumption function is closer 
to the one used in Table 3 than to that in Table 4. This test demonstrates 
that the results reported in Table 3 would not be significantly altered by 
any reasonable slowing of the reaction of the consumption function to 
changes in net worth. 
We also tested the sensitivity of the results to our selection of imports 
plus GNP as the appropriate  measure of transactions in the money demand 
function.  The  test consisted  of  dropping the  modified money  demand 
equation and repeating the experiment with the original money demand 
function, in which transactions are represented  by nominal GNP.  The re- 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.1  -0.2  1.2  4.3  0.2  2.8  1.7  19.6 
0.1  0.3  2.2  3.3  0.3  5.6  1.1  17.9 
0.5  0.5  3.0  2.8  0.3  8.0  -0.1  5.8 
1.1  0.7  3.3  0.8  0.4  7.6  -1.2  2.8 
1.5  0.4  3.5  0.5  0.5  7.4  -2.0  7.3 
1.6  0.1  3.6  0.4  0.6  7.2  -2.4  16.7 
1.7  0.0  3.8  0.3  0.7  7.1  -2.4  25.8 
1.5  -0.2  3.9  0.2  0.7  7.1  -1.9  44.8 
0.4  -0.4  4.2  -0.1  0.8  7.9  3.0  64.9 
-0.6  -0.3  4.0  -0.3  0.7  8.2  5.1  55.6 
-3.8  -0.9  3.2  -0.9  0.3  8.1  7.9  49.0 
-10.5  -1.7  1.5  -1.5  -0.6  5.8  9.2  32.9 
-21.4  -2.3  -1.4  -2.1  -2.8  5.0  27.8  94.9 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
sults are reported  in Table 5. A comparison with Table 3 indicates that the 
effects of this adjustment are not large. The modification works in the ex- 
pected direction. The unemployment rate is not driven as high and  the 
price level ends up somewhat higher. 
It has sometimes been argued that the interaction between prices and 
wages depends upon whether the increase in prices originates within the 
nonfarm business sector or outside it.  Prices can  affect wages through 
two avenues: through demands by workers for higher wages to cover a 
rise in consumption prices, and through the willingness of  firms to pay 
higher wages when the value of the marginal product of labor has risen. 
Price increases whose source is outside the nonfarm business sector do not 
raise the value of labor's marginal product and should, therefore, lead to 
smaller wage gains. Thus a price increase resulting from an external shock 
that raises P,,,, and not Pnf  may not have as large an impact on wages, at 
least initially, as an ordinary rise in  all prices. Because the correlation 
Table  5. Simulated  Economic  Impact  of the Increase  in Oil Prices 
with  a Modified  Money  Demand  Equation,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation  from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion  ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  0.2  -2.4  -2.6  -5.5  0.1  0.1 
2  -2.7  -5.6  -5.1  -10.0  0.3  0.0 
3  -6.1  -9.1  -7.9  -14.3  0.6  -0.  1 
4  -8.4  -11.9  -9.7  -15.8  0.8  -0.1 
5  -10.5  -14.3  -11.5  -17.4  1.0  -0.2 
6  -12.6  -16.5  -13.2  -19.0  1.1  -0.3 
7  -14.0  -17.8  -14.5  -20.2  1.3  -0.3 
8  -14.5  -18.1  -15.3  -21.2  1.4  -0.3 
12  -5.5  -9.7  -14.6  -21.4  1.2  0.0 
16  -9.7  -10.2  -15.8  -22.2  1.3  -0.2 
20  -17.5  -10.6  -14.8  -22.9  1.4  -0.5 
24  -34.0  -14.2  -16.3  -25.5  1.6  -0.8 
28  -52.0  -12.6  -17.0  -26.8  1.6  -1.9 
Source: Simulations  covering the 1967-73 period. Money demand is assumed to be unaffected  by higher 
import prices. Assumptions about the changes in oil prices and about policy are the same as those for 
Table 3. James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  43 
between consumption prices and nonfarm business prices is very close, 
their differential effects are difficult to  estimate; we were in fact  unable 
to do so. The question is critical to our discussion, however, so we decided 
to test how much difference it might make if the price effect estimated in 
the model (which used consumer prices only) were in fact distributed be- 
tween consumer and producer prices. 
We again arbitrarily  altered the original form of the model by breaking 
the long-run price coefficient of 0.989 in the wage equation into two parts. 
We entered two price terms with the same distributed lag into the equa- 
tion. The first term was on the rate of change of the nonfarm business 
deflator, and we gave this term a coefficient of 0.5. The other distributed 
lag was on the rate of change of P,,nn  and we gave this term a coefficient 
of 0.489. Simulation results with this modification to the wage equation 
are reported in Table 6. 
As expected, this change helps repress the rate of wage inflation in the 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions  (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.3  1.2  4.2  0.2  2.7  1.3  19.5 
-0.3  0.0  2.1  3.1  0.3  5.3  0.3  22.0 
-0.1  0.2  2.8  2.5  0.3  7.4  -0.9  14.2 
0.2  0.5  3.0  0.6  0.4  6.9  -1.8  13.2 
0.4  0.2  3.2  0.3  0.4  6.7  -2.1  18.4 
0.3  -0.1  3.3  0.2  0.5  6.5  -2.1  32.4 
0.2  -0.2  3.3  0.1  0.5  6.5  -1.6  45.3 
-0.2  -0.4  3.3  -0.1  0.5  6.5  -0.3  73.7 
-1.5  -0.3  3.4  -0.1  0.6  8.3  9.5  122.3 
-2.6  -0.4  3.0  -0.6  0.4  8.6  10.4  105.9 
-6.1  -0.8  2.1  -0.7  0.0  8.8  12.0  121.0 
-11.7  -1.4  0.8  -1.2  -0.8  7.6  12.0  103.0 
-20.8  -1.8  -1.6  -1.7  -2.8  6.4  20.9  107.5 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  6. Simulated  Economic  Impact  of the Increase  in Oil Prices 
with  a Modffied  Wage  Equation,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  0.1  -2.5  -2.7  -5.5  0.1  0.3 
2  -3.3  -6.0  -5.3  -10.3  0.4  0.3 
3  -7.8  -10.1  -8.4  -15.0  0.6  0.3 
4  -11.6  -13.5  -10.5  -16.9  0.9  0.1 
5  -15.3  -16.4  -12.6  -18.8  1.1  0.0 
6  -18.9  -18.9  -14.4  -20.7  1.3  -0.2 
7  -21.8  -20.5  -15.8  -22.0  1.4  -0.3 
8  -23.8  -20.9  -16.7  -23.0  1.5  -0.4 
12  -21.0  -12.3  -15.8  -23.1  1.4  -0.5 
16  -27.2  -9.7  -15.9  -22.9  1.4  -0.6 
20  -40.8  -9.1  -13.8  -22.1  1.4  -0.9 
24  -62.7  -11.0  -13.7  -22.8  1.5  -1.3 
28  -78.1  -3.4  -11.3  -20.6  1.1  -2.4 
Source: Simulations covering the 1967-73 period. It is assumed that half the price effect on wages comes 
from consumer prices and half from producer prices. Assumptions about changes in oil prices and about 
policy are the same as those for Table 3. 
early  part of the simulation.  The adjustment  to the increase  in oil prices 
is less painful.  The early  rates  of inflation  are somewhat  reduced  and the 
maximum  rise in unemployment  in the later part of the simulations  is 
considerably  reduced.  The most implausible  feature  of the simulation  is 
that wage inflation  is immediately  reduced  by the increase  in oil prices. 
This may be possible,  but seems  unlikely.  In any event,  the modification 
of the wage equation  does not produce  a major  change  in the outcome. 
We next  modified  the assumptions  of the basic  model  to allow  for a rise 
in exports  in response  to the dollar  accumulations  of oil-producing  nations. 
In this variation,  real exports  slowly rose until the nominal  value of the 
increment  matched  the increase  in the value  of imported  oil. In the second 
quarter  of the simulation,  real exports were increased  enough to push 
nominal exports up by  5 percent of the amount of the extra payments 
for oil imports  in the first  quarter  of the simulation.  In successive  quarters, James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  45 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.4  1.2  4.2  0.2  2.7  1.2  18.6 
-0.5  -0.2  2.1  3.1  0.2  5.2  0.3  16.7 
-0.7  -0.3  2.8  2.4  0.3  7.2  -1.0  5.6 
-0.9  -0.2  2.9  0.2  0.3  6.6  -1.9  3.9 
-1.3  -0.5  2.9  -0.2  0.3  6.2  -2.2  9.8 
-1.9  -0.7  2.8  -0.4  0.3  5.9  -2.1  22.8 
-2.7  -0.8  2.7  -0.5  0.3  5.7  -1.4  32.5 
-3.7  -1.1  2.5  -0.7  0.2  5.7  0.0  58.5 
-7.9  -1.1  1.6  -0.8  -0.2  6.9  11.0  107.8 
-11.8  -1.0  0.4  -1.2  -0.7  7.2  15.1  85.9 
-18.0  -1.4  -1.5  -1.4  -1.5  7.0  16.1  81.0 
-26.1  -1.7  -3.6  -1.6  -3.1  5.4  15.5  52.6 
-36.4  -1.8  -6.6  -1.8  -6.3  5.0  25.6  71.8 
this process  was  repeated,  in 5 percent  increments,  until  in the twenty-first 
quarter,  the extra  value of exports  matched  the increased  oil payments. 
The results  of this  experiment  are  reported  in Table  7. Again  they  reflect 
no major  departure  from  the results  of Table  3. Increasing  exports  length- 
ens the period  of adjustment  because  aggregate  demand  does not fall as 
rapidly.  Despite  this  upward  shift  in aggregate  demand,  the economy  must 
endure  sufficient  unemployment  to squeeze  the  excess  inflation  from  prices. 
The adjustment,  while  reduced  in magnitude,  is extended  in time.20 
Initial  conditions  in the economy  may be crucial  to the issue of policy 
responses  to the increase  in oil prices.  Conditions  in 1967  obviously  were 
not the same as those in 1974.  In particular,  the unemployment  rate was 
20. It appears  that any adjustment  in the investment  function  to allow for expanded 
oil exploration  or coal mining, or for development  of alternative  energy  technologies, 
would have similar  effects. 46  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  7.  Simulated  Economic  Impact  of the Increase  in Oil  Prices 
with Rising  U.S.  Exports,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation  from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  0.1  -2.5  -2.7  -5.5  0.1  0.3 
2  -2.8  -5.7  -5.3  -10.1  0.3  0.3 
3  -6.1  -9.1  -8.2  -14.4  0.6  0.4 
4  -8.5  -12.0  -10.1  -15.9  0.8  0.3 
5  -10.6  -14.3  -12.1  -17.4  1.0  0.2 
6  -12.6  -16.4  -13.8  -18.9  1.1  0.1 
7  -13.8  -17.6  -15.1  -20.0  1.3  0.1 
8  -14.2  -18.0  -16.0  -21.0  1.4  0.1 
12  -8.0  -11.3  -16.5  -21.8  1.3  0.3 
16  -9.3  -9.6  -17.3  -22.3  1.3  0.1 
20  -13.0  -7.4  -16.1  -22.0  1.3  -0.  1 
24  -27.0  -9.7  -16.6  -23.8  1.4  -0.6 
28  -35.3  -3.6  -15.7  -23.7  1.2  -1.3 
Source: Simulations covering the 1967-73 period. The value of exports is allowed to rise to match the 
higher value of oil imports. Assumptions about the changes in oil prices and about policy are the same as 
those in Table 3. 
lower in 1967-69 than it has been recently.21  To examine this possibility, 
we conducted the experiment presented in Table 3  starting in the first 
quarter  of 1970 rather than 1967. This shift allows us to analyze the effects 
of  an  oil  price increase under unemployment rates significantly higher 
than those in 1967. Of course, only four years could be simulated in this 
experiment. The results are reported in  Table  8;  again they reveal no 
major changes in the results. The most notable difference is that the price 
adjustment has  been  slowed  since  at  higher  unemployment rates  the 
Phillips curve is flatter-that  is,  a given rise in the unemployment rate 
21 If our model were  linear, the results  would not depend  on initial conditions.  This 
model, however,  has a number  of nonlinearities;  the prime  example  is the Phillips  curve 
since  its usual  hyperbolic  formulation  means  much greater  changes  in inflation  for given 
changes  in the unemployment  rate at low levels of unemployment  than at high levels. James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  47 
Compensation  per  Conisumption  price  Value  of 
manihour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions  (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.4  1.2  4.2  0.2  2.7  1.2  18.6 
-0.3  0.0  2.1  3.1  0.5  5.3  0.3  17.1 
-0.1  0.2  2.9  2.6  1.1  7.4  -0.9  6.8 
0.3  0.5  3.1  0.5  1.6  6.9  -1.9  5.1 
0.4  0.2  3.2  0.3  2.1  6.7  -2.2  11.1 
0.4  -0.1  3.3  0.2  2.6  6.5  -2.2  23.4 
0.2  -0.2  3.4  0.1  3.1  6.5  -1.6  34.8 
-0.2  -0.4  3.4  0.0  3.6  6.5  -0.3  59.1 
-1.5  -0.4  3.5  -0.2  5.8  7.9  8.3  89.9 
-2.6  -0.4  3.2  -0.5  8.2  8.6  11.8  82.7 
-5.6  -0.7  2.4  -0.7  11.0  9.1  15.2  91.5 
-10.7  -1.2  1.1  -1.1  12.6  8.3  16.0  77.3 
-18.4  -1.4  -0.9  -1.4  14.0  8.6  29.8  91.7 
yields a smaller  reduction  in the inflation  rate. This pattern makes the 
adjustment  more difficult  since a larger  rise in unemployment  must be 
endured  to squeeze  out the excess from prices. In this respect, 1974 is 
probably  more  like 1970  than like 1967. 
ACCOMMODATIVE  MONETARY  POLICY 
One obvious policy response  to an event like the surge in oil prices 
would be to accommodate  the original  increase  in prices  with an expan- 
sion of the money stock. We could derive  a monetary  policy that maxi- 
mizes an objective  function  based on, say, the unemployment  rate and 
the rate  of inflation.  We  have  chosen  not to attempt  this,  partly  because  we 
do not want to enter  into a debate  about the parameters  of this objective 
function.  Instead  we have chosen  to analyze  the simple  case in which  the 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  8.  Simulated  Economic  Impact  of the Increase  in Oil  Prices 
with Differing  Initial  Economic  Conditions,  by Selected  Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  national  product  tion ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billionis  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  -0.2  -2.9  -3.1  -6.2  0.1  0.4 
2  -4.3  -6.9  -6.0  -11.1  0.3  0.5 
3  -8.9  -11.4  -9.3  -15.4  0.6  0.5 
4  -11.8  -14.7  -10.9  -15.8  0.8  0.4 
5  -14.1  -17.8  -13.1  -17.7  1.0  0.2 
6  -16.6  -20.9  -15.2  -19.1  1.2  0.2 
7  -17.8  -23.1  -17.0  -20.7  1.4  0.4 
8  -18.0  -24.7  -18.6  -22.3  1.5  0.3 
12  -6.1  -22.0  -21.8  -28.1  1.8  0.9 
16  -12.1  -27.6  -25.9  -32.9  2.3  1.1 
Source: Simulations starting with the economy of  1970 rather than 1967. The assumptions about the 
changes in oil prices and about policy are the same as those in Table 3. 
monetary  authority  responds  by increasing  the money  stock  in proportion 
to the increase  in transactions  demand-the sum of current-dollar  GNP 
plus imports-resulting  from the initial rise in prices  for both imported 
and domestic  oil. After this initial accommodation,  the money stock is 
assumed to grow at its old constant rate. The results of this exercise are 
shown in Table 9. As expected, real output declines much less in this case. 
A decline  still occurs,  of course,  because  even  though  the monetary  au- 
thority  has offset  the impact  of the original  price  increases  on transactions, 
the system still reacts to  the reduction in real income and  wealth. The 
expansion  in the money  stock  also allows  the wage-price  spiral  to continue 
to a much greater  extent.  The average  inflation  rate over the seven-year 
period  is about 0.7 percent  higher  than when the authorities  do not ac- 
commodate the increase in transactions. In the long run, the inflation rate 
must return  to its value in the control simulation.  Achieving  this result 
requires that the average unemployment rate be sufficiently high in the 
transition  period.  Whether  or not the outcome  of this "accommodating" 
monetary  policy is regarded  as superior  to the outcome  with unchanged 
policy, shown  in Table 3, depends  upon the weights  assigned  to the un- 
employment  and inflation  objectives. James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  49 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Ainnual  (billions (billionis (billionis (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.3  1.4  4.3  0.3  3.4  1.3  16.8 
-0.2  0.2  2.5  3.3  0.4  6.6  -0.8  6.3 
0.4  0.5  3.4  2.7  0.4  9.2  -3.7  -2.3 
1.4  1.0  3.7  0.8  0.6  8.9  -7.1  -3.8 
2.2  0.8  4.0  0.6  0.7  8.6  -8.0  -8.6 
3.0  0.7  4.2  0.7  0.8  8.4  -10.0  -5.5 
3.8  0.6  4.6  0.8  1.0  8.3  -10.4  5.4 
4.4  0.6  4.8  0.8  1.0  8.4  -9.8  17.1 
6.9  0.3  6.1  0.7  1.8  9.1  3.0  123.3 
6.8  -0.5  7.0  -0.2  2.8  8.8  4.7  83.2 
Accommodative  monetary  policy has no single definition.  The defini- 
tion that  we chose  is one  that  sometimes  has  been  advanced  as a reasonable 
response  to an exogenous  price shock. Other  definitions  would lead to 
different  results  involving,  among other  things, different  amounts  of un- 
employment  and inflation.  However,  since the increase  in oil prices  has 
several  kinds of impact  on the economy,  no monetary  policy is capable 
of offsetting  all its effects. 
Wage  and  Price  Controls 
We conclude with an examination  of the recent wage-price  controls 
and some observations  on what  might  be expected  from their  removal.22 
The impact  of the controls  was estimated  by comparing  two simulations 
of the full system  holding fiscal and monetary  policy unchanged  in the 
22. Robert Gordon has recently  provided  an analysis of the controls using only a 
wage-price  sector.  His analysis  is approximately  equivalent  to assuming  that policy was 
so adjusted  that the controls had no effect on the unemployment  rate. See Gordon, 
"Response  of Wages  and Prices." 50  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
Table 9.  Simulated  Economic Impact of the Increase in Oil Prices 
with Accommodating  Monetary Policy, by Selected Quarters 
Deviation from control simulation 
Consump-  Unem- 
Gross  nationial  product  tionz  ex-  Disposable  ploy- 
Quarter  penditures  income  ment 
of  Billions  Billions  (billions  (billions  rate  Treasury 
simu-  of current  of 1958  of 1958  of 1958  (per-  bill rate 
lation  dollars  dollars  dollars)  dollars)  cent)  (percent) 
1  0.4  -2.1  -2.6  -5.4  0.1  -0.2 
2  -1.9  -5.0  -4.8  -9.7  0.3  -0.4 
3  -4.2  -7.7  -7.3  -13.7  0.5  -0.6 
4  -5.3  -9.6  -8.7  -14.9  0.6  -0.5 
5  -6.1  -11.2  -10.2  -16.2  0.8  -0.5 
6  -7.0  -12.7  -11.6  -17.4  0.9  -0.6 
7  -7.4  -13.6  -12.6  -18.3  1.0  -0.5 
8  -6.7  -13.5  -13.2  -19.1  1.1  -0.5 
12  10.4  -1.9  -10.8  -17.6  0.6  0.1 
16  9.3  -3.8  -12.4  -18.6  0.8  0.1 
20  8.9  -3.7  -10.9  -19.0  0.8  0.0 
24  -2.1  -10.3  -13.7  -22.1  1.0  -0.2 
28  -26.8  -20.2  -19.1  -27.7  1.6  -1.4 
Source: Simulations covering the  1967-73 period. It is assumed that the money stock is increased to 
accommodate the transactions demand of the original price increases. The increase in oil prices is the same 
as that assumed in Table 3. 
same  manner  as in the experiment  reported  in Table  3. In the first  simula- 
tion, the residuals  of the price equation  for the period of price controls 
were  added  to the price  equation;  in the  second  they  were  not. The  rationale 
for  this  procedure  is the  negligible  character  of the  residuals  of the  price  equa- 
tion  prior  to the  introduction  of the  controls,  revealed  in Figure  2, so that  we 
assume  that the errors  thereafter  are due entirely  to controls.  Under this 
assumption,  the difference  between  the two simulations  measures  the ef- 
fects  of the controls  in the full system.  These  are summarized  in Table 10. 
Over the whole interval  through  the end of 1973, the price controls 
raised  real output by an estimated  cumulative  total of $17 billion over 
what it would have been in their absence. The price of consumption 
goods (P,0n)  ends up 3.8 points (2.5 percent)  higher  without  the controls, 
after  being  as much  as 5.1 points  (3.7 percent)  higher  at a time coinciding 
with  the end of Phase  II. By the end of the period,  prices  are rising  some- James L. Pierce and Jared J. Enzler  51 
Compensation  per  Consumption  price  Value  of 
manhour  deflator  Corporate  corporate 
Exports  Imports  profits  shares 
Annual  Annual  (billions (billions (billions  (billions 
rate of  Index  rate of  of  of  of  of 
Amount  change  (1958=  change  current  current  current  current 
(cents)  (percent)  100)  (percent)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars)  dollars) 
-0.3  -0.3  1.2  4.1  0.2  2.7  1.4  21.7 
-0.2  0.0  2.0  3.0  0.3  5.3  0.7  29.2 
0.0  0.3  2.8  2.5  0.3  7.6  -0.1  28.4 
0.5  0.6  3.0  0.7  0.4  7.3  -0.6  27.1 
0.8  0.4  3.2  0.5  0.5  7.2  -0.6  31.0 
1.0  0.2  3.4  0.3  0.6  7.1  -0.5  48.0 
1.1  0.1  3.5  0.2  0.6  7.2  0.0  64.2 
1.0  -0.1  3.5  0.1  0.6  7.4  1.3  97.9 
1.8  0.3  4.1  0.4  0.9  9.9  11.5  160.6 
2.9  0.0  4.4  -0.3  1.1  10.5  9.7  140.4 
2.3  -0.2  4.4  0.0  1.0  11.2  10.6  177.0 
0.6  -0.6  4.2  -0.4  0.9  10.6  6.1  148.3 
-4.8  -1.3  3.0  -1.2  0.4  7.9  6.1  108.5 
what  less in the simulation  without  price  controls.  This observation  may 
be misleading,  since  in the last four quarters  of the simulations,  the econ- 
omy moves from the restrictive  Phase  II to the less restrictive  Phases  III 
and IV. 
The behavior  of compensation  per manhour  may give a better  idea of 
the difference  between  the ending rates of inflation.  By the end of the 
period,  the  rate  of wage  increase  is the same  with or without  the controls. 
In their  absence,  higher  prices  would have driven  up interest  rates for a 
given  money  stock,  which  in turn  would  have  lowered  output  and  employ- 
ment  and  eventually  slowed  inflation.  This  depressing  effect  is partially  off- 
set, however,  by the higher level of corporate  profits and stock prices 
in the no-controls  simulation,  which stimulates  consumption  and invest- 
ment  demand.  The difference  is greatest  in the last quarter  of 1972,  when 
corporate  profits  are $20 billion  higher  without  the controls  and the value ri  r.'I en  t  a  s  tI  en 
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of common stocks is $140  billion  higher.  Near the end of the simulation 
the depressing  effects  of the high level of prices,  acting through  interest 
rates,  become  the predominant  factor.  Given  our  assumption  of no change 
in the money  stock between  simulations,  high  inflation  in the early  part  of 
the no-control  simulation  must be offset  by low inflation  later. This ad- 
justment  will require  a period  of higher  unemployment  rates, which are 
observed  throughout  the simulation  period  and which  reach  a level  that is 
0.9 point  higher  by the end of 1973.  Given  the growth  in the money  stock, 
the  process  in  which  unemployment  rises  and  eventually  slows  inflation  takes 
much longer  in the present  case than it does in the case of higher  prices 
for imported  oil. The reason is that inflationary  disturbances  that are 
purely  domestic  redistribute  income within  the economy  between  profits 
and personal  incomes;  while  a rise in prices  of imported  oil reduces  real 
national  income and wealth,  which immediately  helps set in motion the 
deflationary  forces  that raise  unemployment. 
This exercise  may overstate  the price  effects  of the controls.  First, with 
controls,  the prices  at which  transactions  took place  may  have  exceeded  re- 
corded prices because they reflected  the elimination  of discounts and 
deterioration  of quality.  If this phenomenon  is important,  the residuals 
in the price equation,  which we interpreted  as the direct effect of the 
controls on the price level, are smaller  than they appear.  Further,  it is 
not reasonable  to expect  a change  in the inflation  rate brought  about by 
an administrative  squeeze  on profits  to be repeated  or even maintained. 
If that is how the controls  were  working,  participants  in wage  bargaining 
might not have extrapolated  the effect in the manner  suggested  by the 
price  term  in the wage equation.  The simulation  may therefore  overstate 
the indirect downward  pressure  on wage increases  that derived from 
controls  on prices. 
However,  there is a counter-argument.  We have ignored  the possible 
influence  of the unusual  increases  in import prices in the price-control 
period.  These  increases  may  have  driven  up the prices  of import-competing 
goods. Our  price  equation  does not capture  this effect;  had there  not been 
controls the increase  in import  prices  might have produced  even higher 
prices  than those predicted  in the no-controls  simulation.  To the extent 
this is true we have understated  the effects  of the controls. 
All in all, the exercise  strongly  suggests  that the controls  considerably 
improved  the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff  while  they were  operative, 
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quite another  matter.  They have obviously  caused some unwanted  dis- 
tortions  and if they had been continued  without  modification,  the dis- 
tortions would have been likely to grow worse. In addition, the total 
removal  of controls  in 1974  poses new inflationary  problems. 
The results  of the various  simulation  experiments  strongly  suggest  that 
the economy will respond differently  to the decontrolling  of domestic 
prices  than it will to the increased  price  of domestic  oil. Put most simply, 
the initial reduction  in aggregate  demand should be smaller and the 
upward  pressure  on prices  greater  for a price  rise coming  from decontrol 
than for a rise of the same size coming from the increase  in oil prices. 
In 1974,  policy  must cope somehow  with the effects  of both these shocks 
at once. Comments  and 
Discussion 
David  I. Fand:  Pierce  and Enzler  analyze  how external  shocks  may impart 
inflationary  spurts  to the economy. One problem  is to distinguish  the 
effects on relative  prices-high prices-from the effects  on the inflation 
rate-rising prices. If there were no lags, so that these external  shocks 
had immediate  effects on the economy, they could be ranked  in terms 
of their potential  contribution  to inflation:  a once-and-for-all  change  in 
the relative  price  of a commodity  causes  high prices  and should  theoreti- 
cally have the least impact  on the inflation  rate; while an external  shock 
that causes  price  acceleration  should  have  the greatest  inflationary  impact. 
Because  of the interactions  and the lags, however,  a one-shot  increase  in 
relative  prices  may, in fact, affect  the rate of inflation  over a fairly  long 
period.  There  is also a second  difficulty.  Depending  on the circumstances, 
the shocks considered  in this paper  may incorporate  different  combina- 
tions of these effects:  thus when  a cartel  raises  the price of oil, the move 
may constitute  either  a one-shot  jump or the first  in a continuing  series 
of rises; and the imposition  of wage and price controls  may be either  a 
one-time  influence  or a continuing  factor  affecting  all prices. 
Pierce  and Enzler  introduce  a money  demand  function  that is designed 
to pick up any increase  in money demand  resulting  from a rise in trans- 
actions associated with the higher import prices. Since import prices 
have risen  by as much as 10 percent  in recent  quarters,  the demand  for 
nominal money should have increased  significantly.  While the Pierce- 
Enzler  money demand  formulation  stresses  the rise in transactions,  the 
point they are making  about the greater  demand  for nominal  money is 
very similar  to a view expressed  recently  that 6 percent  money growth 
when  the inflation  rate  is 8 percent  constitutes  a destruction  in real  balances 
of approximately  2 percent  and is deflationary.  Thus while a policy of 
6 percent  money growth  is seen as liberal  with, say, a 2 percent  inflation 
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rate,  it is viewed  as deflationary  in an economy  with  an 8 percent  inflation 
rate.  Since  Pierce  and Enzler  frame  their  money  demand  analysis  in terms 
of transactions,  they argue  that a rise in the price of imports  increases 
transactions  and requires  an accommodating  increase  in nominal  money. 
I believe  that this change  in money demand  may be viewed either  as a 
sort of real-balance  effect  or as a transactions  effect. 
The results  obtained  by Pierce  and Enzler  for the cartelization  of oil 
imports  and for wage and price  controls  may appear  surprising.  In fact, 
considering  the results  of the imposition  of an oil cartel shown in their 
Table 3, it is not clear whether  one is viewing  the effects  of inflation  or 
deflation.  Inflation  accelerates  so sharply  in the early periods that the 
subsequent  periods  are dominated  by deflationary  after-effects.  The actual 
deflation  scenario  in the twenty-eight-quarter  simulations  shown in the 
tables varies  with the particular  assumptions  introduced  in each simula- 
tion. One would imagine  that if an oil cartel  raises  prices  and generates 
one set of macrodynamics,  the lowering  of prices  through  wage  and price 
controls  should generate  the opposite  kind of effects.  But the wage and 
price controls  simulation  in Table 10 is not quite the inverse  of the oil 
cartel  case.  The differences  reflect  interest  rate  effects  related  to the Pierce- 
Enzler  money  demand  function,  the different  orders  of magnitude  of the 
two shocks,  and the impact on profits  and their distribution  in the two 
cases. A comparison  of these simulation  results suggests  that they are 
sensitive  to the assumptions  made  in introducing  the shocks  arising  from 
the oil cartelization  and wage-price  controls. 
Pierce  and Enzler  question  the definition  of monetary  accommodation, 
and  point  out some  of the  ambiguities  in this  concept.  Given  a recognizable 
and substantial  external  jolt, like the oil embargo,  that could have signifi- 
cant effects  on the economy,  the monetary  authorities  are generally  ex- 
pected  somehow  to accommodate  it. But accommodation  is very difficult 
to define  in detail  for the concrete  cases.  In one of the simulations  mone- 
tary accommodation  is introduced  in the oil cartel case by adding an 
increment  to the growth  of money stock in the first  quarter  equal  to the 
percentage  increment  in current GNP plus imports arising from the 
higher oil prices. Obviously,  accommodation  can be defined in many 
other ways, depending  on one's views about interest  rates, prices, un- 
employment,  and inflation. 
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Enzler  take the 1967-73  rate of monetary  growth  to represent  a constant 
monetary  policy in their simulations.  But other alternatives  might be 
interesting.  Thus one could try a simulation  experiment  that embodies 
relatively  unchanged  aggregate  demand  in money terms-that is, MV- 
or unemployment  or the rate  of inflation.  A comparison  of these alterna- 
tive simulation  experiments  might  be useful. 
The simulations  are all conducted  in terms  of the growth  rates  in M1. 
Since M1 diverged  from M2 several  times in the 1967-73 period, the 
simulation  results  with  an M2 policy  would  be interesting. 
Pierce and Enzler  take up the oil cartel and wage-price  controls to 
analyze  the cumulative  effects  on the price  level and other  macroeconomic 
variables.  They  are interested  in seeing  the impact  these  jolts have on the 
inflation  rate and what kind of monetary  policy may be appropriate  to 
minimize  their  undesirable  repercussions.  An alternative  procedure  is to 
turn the simulation  analysis  around-to  ask how much of the observed 
1973  inflation  can be attributed  to the domestic  policy and how much  to 
external  jolts. 
The simulations  reported  in this paper  cover  the 1967-73  period,  when 
there  were  essentially  no supply  shortages  and no bottlenecks.  As Pierce 
and Enzler  caution, their results  may not apply directly  to 1973, which 
suffered  from both of these problems.  Failure  of supply  to respond  and 
the impact  of the restrained  supply  on the price  level are factors  that do 
not operate  ordinarily,  and that were not present  in the period of the 
simulation.  It is therefore  difficult  to apply the simulation  analysis  to 
the period since 1973, even if the simulation  results  appear  reasonable 
for a more  normal  period. 
The Pierce-Enzler  paper  considers  how external  jolts affect  prices  and 
the rate of inflation,  and thus illustrates  how the external  environment 
can affect  movements  in the price  level  of a particular  country.  If a country 
is willing  to take sufficiently  strong  domestic  measures,  it may be able to 
overcome  these  external  effects,  but  the required  measures  may  be extreme. 
The Pierce-Enzler  results  may therefore  be viewed  in a larger  context as 
illustrating  situations  in which a country, in effect, loses control over 
its price  level. The Pierce-Enzler  experiments  are for the U.S. economy- 
that is, a large country  with a relatively  small foreign sector; and yet 
even in this case these  external  influences  may have relatively  long-lasting 
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for a small  country  with  a large  foreign  sector,  it is much  easier  to imagine 
a significant  impact  of the external  environment  on developments  in the 
domestic  price level. Pushing  this idea somewhat,  it seems to  suggest 
that a country's  control  over  its price  level  may weaken  as its dependence 
on the outside  world  deepens. 
Perhaps  the most interesting  and the most important  lesson of the 
Pierce-Enzler  simulations  is the dramatization  of the difficulties  in formu- 
lating  policy  to take account  of even  large  and recognizable  disturbances. 
The results  obtained  with the various  simulations  depend  very much on 
the particular  assumptions  used to analyze  the external  shock and its 
impact. But even though the kind of inflation and the other macro- 
economic  consequences  associated  with  a given  set of disturbances  may  be 
uncertain,  the monetary  authorities  must  nevertheless  consider  alternative 
accommodating  measures  and frame  policy  to keep the economy  moving 
on some  acceptable  track.  This  paper  does,  therefore,  point  up the dilemma 
of choosing  among  policy  alternatives  with  unknown  consequences  to cope 
with  external  disturbances  whose  effects  are  also uncertain. 
R. J. Gordon:  The Pierce-Enzler  paper is a very timely and important 
one. The qualitative  results  they present  are hard to quarrel  with. How- 
ever, I do want to question  some of their specific  quantitative  findings 
and focus on certain  aspects  of the model they use which I think could 
be improved. 
Table  3 shows  the effects  of a one-time  increase  in the price  level with- 
out any accommodative  response from the Fed-that  is, the growth 
of the money supply  remains  unchanged.  The initial effect  is an upsurge 
of both inflation  -and unemployment,  which seems entirely  reasonable. 
And, since  this is a model with a natural  unemployment  rate,  in the long 
run the economy eventually  returns  to the unemployment  and inflation 
rates  that would  have prevailed  had the initial  jump in the price  level not 
occurred.  The only surprising  thing about this eventual  outcome  is that 
after  seven  years,  the economy  is still not very far along in the long-run 
adjustment  process.  At that time the unemployment  rate (the last entry 
in Table  3) is just starting  to recede  and is still well above  its control  level. 
Another  surprise  in the results  in Table 3 is the reduction  in the real 
wage that occurs.  Wages  fall 3 percent  behind  consumer  prices  with the 
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the wage equation  explains  too much of the rate of change of wages in 
terms of the Phillips  curve and too little in terms of past inflation.  In 
this model, high oil prices  bring  on a recession  and high unemployment, 
which then holds down wages.  But I think we have seen a reduction  in 
the effectiveness  of high unemployment  rates in restraining  wages. In- 
creases in  welfare benefits and in unemployment  compensation  have 
diminished  the downward  pressure  that unemployment  used to exert. If 
I am right, the true story is even more pessimistic  than the one told in 
this paper. Unemployment  will take longer to push down wages and 
prices, and it might not peak out for nine or ten years rather  than the 
six years  shown  in the model. 
But there are conceivable  adjustments  to the model that would act 
in the opposite  direction,  leading  to more optimistic  results.  If the price 
elasticity  for oil is larger  than Pierce  and Enzler  allow, the demand  for 
imported  oil will be less than that in their model and the inflationary 
effects of the oil embargo  will be smaller.  If one believes  the price of 
imported  oil will fall from the $10 level they assume,  one would have 
another  ground  for optimism. 
A separate  point is the relation  between  real GNP and unemployment 
shown in the latter quarters  of the simulations  in Table 3. Okun's  law 
is clearly violated and there is too much unemployment  for the real 
shortfall  in output  that is shown. If one believes  the output simulation, 
one can be more  hopeful  about  unemployment  than this model is. 
Another  reason for optimism  is brought  out by Table 6. Prices  may 
affect wages through  the effects  that higher  product  prices  have on the 
demand  for labor as well as through  the outward  shift that higher  con- 
sumer  prices impart  to the labor supply  curve. This is particularly  im- 
portant if adult males exhibit an inelastic  labor supply so that wages 
depend  on the nominal  demand  for labor. I think this view of the wage 
relation helps explain why wages have been rising so moderately  over 
the last year. 
Table 9, which  details  the effects  of a more accommodating  monetary 
policy, illustrates  the magnitudes  in the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff 
among  which  society  must  choose. Compared  with the results  in Table  3, 
the unemployment  rate stays  about 1 percent  lower  for five years  and the 
inflation  rate is about 1 percent  higher  at the end of that time. The extra 
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of wages to  more unemployment that I have noted, but the lesson still 
comes through: only minimal inroads can be made against inflation with 
even an extended recessionary situation. 
General  Discussion 
Walter Salant and others questioned the generality of the Pierce-Enzler 
formulation of the transactions demand for money. Salant suggested that 
some fraction of exports and imports should be included in a measure of 
transactions demand. To the extent that the demand is associated with 
financing production, exports should be included; and to the extent that 
it is associated with financing final purchases, imports should be included. 
GNP  already includes exports fully  and  the  Pierce-Enzler adjustment 
incorporates imports fully as well. But unlike goods and services that are 
produced and sold in the United States, exports and imports do not embody 
both these aspects of transactions demand. Jared Enzler conceded that 
Salant had a valid conceptual point, but argued that the exact proportions 
in which imports and exports should enter transactions demand could not 
be known, and that the simple procedure of adding all imports was a sub- 
stantial improvement over ignoring them at a time when import prices 
were rising abruptly. James Pierce noted that the Federal Reserve is now 
collecting data on  the  ownership of  demand deposits, which might fa- 
cilitate analysis of the distribution of money balances between households 
and business, and hence the nature of transactions demand. 
William Nordhaus asserted that the oil embargo would greatly stimu- 
late  capital investment since,  in  most  studies, capital  and  energy are 
substitutes in production. This upsurge of investment might be a signifi- 
cant offset to deflationary  pressures  arising from higher oil prices. William 
Brainard  replied that the response of business investment in the aggregate 
was not so clear; the energy shortage was curtailing expansion plans of 
some  industries, such as  utilities. Enzler explained that he  and  Pierce 
regarded the immediate response of business investment as too uncertain 
to permit incorporating any special effects from that source in the model. 
However, even if investment were stimulated, it could not offset many of 
the complications arising from the higher oil prices. He noted that the 
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vided some evidence on how a surge in demand in other sectors, such as 
business investment, would alter the main simulation. 
Salant noted that a policy to offset the effects of the rise in oil prices 
on domestic output and employment could not also restore the levels of 
consumption and investment. Higher oil prices caused a deterioration in 
the  terms of  trade that required a  reduction in  real consumption  and 
investment. John Kareken added that the extent of such an effect would 
depend on what oil exporters did with their higher revenues. In the basic 
case of the model, it is assumed that they never expand their demand for 
U.S.  goods  so  that no  need arises to  aim at a lower level of  domestic 
consumption and investment. 
Nicholas Kaldor offered a more pessimistic view of price developments 
than that embodied in the model. In view of the British experience, he 
believed that industrial prices and wages would rise fully to  reflect the 
rise in oil prices, pushing the price level substantially higher than Pierce 
and Enzler project. Wages would not be restrained significantly by modest 
increases in unemployment; and, because of the worsening in unemploy- 
ment that would ensue, the central bank would not try to hold to a growth 
path for the money supply as Pierce and Enzler had assumed. 